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INTRODUCTION
Analyzing a claim that governmental action violates a constitutional
right requires up to two analytically distinct determinations. The first is
whether the constitutional right reaches the governmental action—what
Professor Schauer illuminatingly calls determining the right’s coverage.1
If coverage does not extend to the governmental action—as is true of
prohibitions on fighting words, obscene material,2 or two chief executive
officers’ discussions to fix prices3—then the constitutional claim
automatically fails.
* University Distinguished Professor, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to thank
the conference organizers as well as the Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
1. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration
of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2004) [hereinafter Schauer, The
Boundaries] (distinguishing coverage and protection); Frederick Schauer, The Politics and
Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1621 (2015) (discussing
the scope of coverage and protection of the First Amendment); but see Mark Tushnet, The
Coverage/Protection Distinction in the Law of Freedom of Speech—An Essay on Meta-Doctrine in
Constitutional Law 1–61 (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 16-26, Apr. 26, 2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2770774 (providing a critical analysis of the coverage/protection
distinction).
2. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1975) (holding that First Amendment
protections do not extend to obscene material).
3. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1–2 (discussing this example).
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But even if the right’s coverage extends to the government’s action,
the action is not per se unconstitutional. For instance, though the Equal
Protection Clause’s coverage unquestionably extends to a public school’s
affirmative action program, not all affirmative action programs are
unconstitutional.4 Professor Schauer calls this second step determining
the right’s degree-of-protection, which is reflected in important part by
which legal test a court uses to determine when restrictions of a
constitutional right (hereinafter a right-restriction) is constitutionally
permissible.5 Strict scrutiny, probably the best known of the doctrinal
tests, allows right-restrictions if the government aims to achieve a
“compelling governmental interest” by “narrowly tailored” means.6
Intermediate scrutiny permits right-restrictions to achieve an “important
governmental objective” that are pursued in a “substantially related”
manner.7 The Supreme Court has ruled that campaign finance restrictions
that limit speech are permissible only to achieve a “sufficiently important
interest” in a “closely drawn” way.8
Many high-profile constitutional battles concern coverage questions,
for example whether the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms extends
to the use of firearms for purposes of hunting and self-defense.9 How
coverage questions should be decided is a critical issue that rightly has
been the subject of extensive scholarly discussion and public debate. But
at least as important are the second step degree-of-protection
determinations. It is that topic that this Essay explores, more specifically
the judicial inputs that are constituent parts of a determination that a rightrestriction is constitutionally permissible.
This Essay’s inquiry is usefully approached by introducing
terminology that does not precisely track legal doctrine. Rather than
asking, “what counts as a compelling governmental interest?” or “what
qualifies as an important governmental objective?,” this Essay undertakes
a more general inquiry that applies to all heightened scrutiny tests. But
before introducing that general inquiry, some traditional doctrinal
analysis is necessary.
4. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
5. Schauer, The Boundaries, supra note 1, at 1769.
6. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (applying strict scrutiny analysis to the use of race in
college admissions).
7. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (analyzing gender classification statutes using
this formulation, which is now referred to as intermediate scrutiny).
8. See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014) (invalidating as
unconstitutional aggregate contribution limits to federal campaigns).
9. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 594 (2008) (holding that the Second
Amendment guarantees an individual’s right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a
militia and to use that arm for self defense and other traditionally lawful purposes).
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Strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and the doctrine applicable to
campaign finance regulations are all two-prong means-end scrutiny tests.
The demand that there be a “compelling governmental interest,” an
“important governmental interest,” or a “sufficiently important interest”
requires courts to determine what end the regulation attempts to
accomplish. “Narrowly tailored,” “substantially related,” and “closely
drawn” are “means” requirements that are performed in relation to the
conclusion reached in the “ends” prong. For example, strict scrutiny’s
“means” prong requires a court to ask whether governmental action is
“narrowly tailored” in relation to achieving the end that qualifies as a
“compelling governmental interest.” A broader array of qualifying
“ends” accordingly will sustain a broader set of “means.”
So, the “ends” and “means” prongs are not analytically distinct. The
“ends” prong plays dual doctrinal duties, insofar as the “means” prong’s
analysis depends on conclusions reached in the “ends” prong. The heavy
work played by each doctrine’s “ends” prong is the justification for this
Essay’s focus on the “ends” prong.10 Because these heightened scrutiny
tests share a common two-part structure, we can generate a single
investigative question that applies to all of them. As regards each
doctrine’s “ends” prong, how is a court to determine what qualifies as a
sufficiently important policy that justifies a governmental restriction of a
constitutional right? In short, how is a court to answer the “Sufficiency
Question”?11
I. THE INADEQUACY OF WORD-FOCUSED ANALYSIS
The Sufficiency Question is not answered by attentively considering
the implications of each doctrine’s particular verbal formulation. Though
strict scrutiny’s “compelling governmental interest” formulation suggests
there must be a more significant interest than intermediate scrutiny’s
“important government objective,” comparisons of this sort rarely help
answer whether a particular policy satisfies the Sufficiency Question.12
10. This Essay’s focus on the ends-prong should not be misunderstood as suggesting that the
judicial role regarding the means-prong is inconsequential.
11. I first introduced this terminology a few years ago. See Mark D. Rosen, When Are
Constitutional Rights Non-Absolute? McCutcheon, Conflicts, and the Sufficiency Question, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1535, 1538 (2015). This Essay builds on that Article’s analysis.
12. Rarely, though not never. Such comparisons would be helpful in the event that
governmental restriction (“R”) was upheld in Case 1 against a constitutional rights claim that
triggered strict scrutiny, and R thereafter was challenged in Case 2 as violating another
constitutional right that triggered only intermediate scrutiny. The determination in Case 1 that R
advanced a compelling governmental interest would lead to an a fortiori conclusion in Case 2 that
intermediate scrutiny’s ends prong also was satisfied. Even so, the Sufficiency Question remains
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Nor do excavations of the semantic contents of the words “compelling,”
“important,” or “sufficiently important” provide answers. For example,
because affirmative action programs are subject to strict scrutiny, a public
school’s affirmative action program is constitutionally permissible only
if it aims to advance a “compelling governmental interest.”13 A majority
of the United States Supreme Court Justices has concluded that diversity
in higher education qualifies as a “compelling governmental interest,” but
that increasing the number of persons who will work in underserved
communities does not.14 And four Justices think diversity in high schools
is not a compelling governmental interest.15 Regardless of how one
thinks these questions should be answered, everyone can agree that
determining whether any of these three goals satisfies strict scrutiny’s
“ends” prong does not turn on the semantic content of “compelling.”
A common way of describing the judicial role in answering the
Sufficiency Question is to say judges are interpreting the crucial doctrinal
words of “compelling” and “important.” But this is not an illuminating
description of a judge’s decision-making process because the text-based
activity of “interpretation” does not meaningfully capture the thought
process that comprises the determination that diversity in secondary
schools is, or is not, sufficiently important to permit affirmative action.
Likewise, consider the Justices’ disagreement in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission as to whether preventing quid pro quo
corruption is the only permissible ground for restricting campaign finance
contributions. Five Justices thought so, while four Justices thought
rights-restrictions were justifiable to protect the integrity of the electoral
process.16 The Justices’ divergent views are not meaningfully described
as a dispute as to how the phrase “sufficient government interest” should
be interpreted.
To be sure, the Citizen United holding can be labeled a determination
that only preventing quid pro quo corruption qualifies as a “sufficient
government interest.” But that does not mean the activity of interpreting
“sufficient government interest” led to that conclusion. And it is the
methodological question of how courts conclude whether a given policy
in full force vis-à-vis the first court’s determination.
13. And the public school’s affirmative action program, per the means-prong, must do so in a
narrowly tailored fashion.
14. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324–30 (analyzing Justice Powell’s opinion in
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
15. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
16. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 334 (2010); see Mark D. Rosen,
The Structural Constitutional Principle of Republican Legitimacy, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371,
444–52 (2012) (discussing Republican Legitimacy’s superiority to corruption in understanding
Citizens United).
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satisfies the Sufficiency Question that is being probed here.
II. SMOKE-OUT AND TRADE-OFF
So if interpreting the words “compelling” and “important” is not the
activity by which courts answer the Sufficiency Question, what is?
Though the Supreme Court has decided scores of cases in which it has
been called upon to decide whether a particular policy satisfied the
Sufficiency Question, the Court has provided precious little guidance as
to how it comes to its determination.
Perhaps the best known explanation can be found in City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson, Co., where Justice O’Connor explained that “the purpose
of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring
that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant
use of a highly suspect tool.”17 But Justice O’Connor’s description is
inadequate as a methodological explanation of how courts answer the
Sufficiency Question, for how does the importance of a policy assure that
race is not being used illegitimately? Croson not only neglects to answer
this question, but there is no apparent answer to it because there is no
necessary connection between the importance of a governmental goal and
the illegitimate use of race. This is the case because the two are not
mutually exclusive. Pursuing a magnificently important objective does
not guarantee that the government has not also used race in an illegitimate
fashion. Accordingly, Croson’s smoke-out rationale does not provide
any guidance as to what qualifies as a “goal important enough” to permit
racial classifications.18 And this conclusion is generalizable beyond strict
scrutiny: the smoke-out rationale does not help answer the Sufficiency
Question.19
A more promising approach to understanding how courts answer the
Sufficiency Question is found in Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.20 Casey
famously retained the holding in Roe v. Wade that women have a
constitutionally protected liberty interest to terminate their pregnancies,21
but substituted the sui generis undue burden standard for Roe’s strict
17. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
18. Another implication is that where race is used illegitimately, the government policy should
be deemed unconstitutional, regardless of how important the policy may be.
19. This is not to suggest that constitutional doctrine never functions to smoke-out illegitimacy,
but only that illegitimacy cannot be ascertained by analyzing how important a governmental
objective is. For this reason, the smoke-out rationale does not assist in answering the Sufficiency
Question.
20. 505 U.S. 833, 843 (1992).
21. Id. at 878.
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scrutiny test.22 Even under a strict scrutiny test, Justice O’Connor rightly
observed that a woman’s constitutional right was not absolute, but could
be restricted to advance the State’s “important and legitimate interest in
protecting the potentiality of human life.”23 Nonetheless, the plurality in
Casey thought that in practice, Roe’s strict scrutiny test “undervalue[d]
the State’s interest in potential life . . . .”24 Casey’s plurality thought the
undue burden standard was the “appropriate means of reconciling the
State’s interest . . . in protecting fetal life . . . with the woman’s
constitutionally protected liberty.” 25
Though Casey’s plurality aimed to justify its shift from one legal test
to another, its explanation illuminates how legal tests actually operate,
and in so doing aids this Essay’s methodological inquiry. Rather than
treating legal tests as being aimed at resolving the binary question of
whether the government was or was not pursuing an illegitimate end,
Casey understands that legal tests can serve as tools for dealing with the
conflicts that arise when society holds multiple legitimate commitments.
To illustrate, there is a strong societal commitment (let’s call it “C1”) to
a woman’s liberty to choose whether to carry the fetus to term or abort;
indeed, C1 is so important it rises to the level of a constitutional interest.
But there are other legitimate societal commitments as well, such as
protecting the potentiality of human life (let’s call that “C2”). What
happens when these two commitments come into conflict?26
Roe’s strict scrutiny test permitted restrictions on C1 for the purpose of
advancing C2.27 It is worth unpacking what this means: even strict
scrutiny permits trade-offs of a constitutional interest for the purpose of
achieving a sub-constitutional interest. The problem with strict scrutiny
in the abortion context, in the view of Casey’s plurality, was it did not
allow enough trade-offs of the constitutional interest for purposes of
advancing the sub-constitutional interest of C2.
To the extent that intermediate scrutiny’s “ends” prong is more easily
22. Id. at 953.
23. Id. at 871 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)).
24. Id. at 875.
25. Id. at 876.
26. For an argument against the proposition that there cannot be conflicts between these
commitments, see Rosen, supra note 11, at 1543–60.
27. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869–71 (emphasizing the importance of adhering to the Roe holding
and drawing the line of compelling interests at viability, noting that a woman’s right to terminate
her pregnancy before viability is central to Roe); Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (holding that the State’s
important and legitimate interest in the health of a pregnant woman is at the end of the first
trimester, based on established medical fact which finds mortality in abortion to be less than
mortality in normal childbirth up to the end of the first trimester).
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satisfied than strict scrutiny’s, intermediate scrutiny allows the
constitutional commitment with which it is associated28 to be traded-off
for the sake of achieving a broader set of competing commitments. For
that reason, there might be great significance as to which legal test the
Supreme Court associates with a given constitutional right.29 The
expression “the Sufficiency Question” is not intended to erase such
differences between the different legal tests’ “ends” prongs, but rather is
used to clarify that all “ends” tests share characteristics that raise the same
methodological challenge. To be precise, the tests permit constitutional
commitments to be traded-off against competing commitments of a
constitutional, and sometimes even sub-constitutional, dimension.
Therefore, all “ends” prongs implicate the same question of how courts
are to determine which competing commitments are sufficiently
important to allow a trade-off with a constitutional commitment.
It is worthwhile to delve into the relationship between the paradigms
of smoke-out and trading-off. To begin, smoking-out illegitimacy is very
different from trading-off competing legitimate commitments. Smokeout is a binary inquiry that aims to uncover an illegitimacy. If
illegitimacy is found, the governmental action is unconstitutional. By
contrast, deciding when, and to what degree, there might be trade-offs
between two commitments when they come into conflict is a non-binary,
qualitative determination that turns on the relative importance of the
competing interests. So it would be a mistake to treat trading-off as a
subset of smoking-out.30 These descriptions are conceptually distinct,
and smoking-out does not fairly capture the thought process involved in
trading-off between multiple legitimate commitments.
It might be objected that this Essay’s claim that trade-off is non-binary
misdescribes how heightened scrutiny tests actually operate. For
example, because a high school’s affirmative action program is subject to
strict scrutiny, the doctrinal question before the Supreme Court in Parents
Involved in Community Schools (“PICS”) v. Seattle School District No. 1
28. Or, to be more precise, with the context in which the right is operating. For example,
regulations of speech frequently, though not always, are subject to strict scrutiny. Compare Reed
v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (applying strict scrutiny to a regulation
challenged under the free speech clause), with Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980) (applying less than strict scrutiny to commercial
speech challenged under the free speech clause).
29. I say “might be” because the Court’s application of the legal tests has not been uniform.
Insofar as the Court sometimes applies strict scrutiny in a highly forgiving manner, the distinction
between the different levels of scrutiny becomes uncertain, and the importance of which specific
test applies becomes less certain.
30. To reiterate, I do not claim that doctrine never functions in a smoke-out capacity, but that
smoke-out does not exhaust the roles doctrine plays. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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was whether diversity in secondary schools is a compelling governmental
interest.31 This is a binary question, continues the objection, insofar as
its answer is either yes or no.
But this objection conflates conclusions—the binary “yes’” or “no”
answer—with the reasoning process that generates the conclusions. It is
the latter that is of interest to this Essay. Accordingly, the relevant
question for present purposes is whether four Justices’ conclusion that
diversity in secondary schools is not a compelling governmental
interest32 resulted from a binary analysis that aimed to identify a flat-out
illegitimacy, or from a non-binary qualitative assessment that took
account of the relative significance of competing societal commitments.
On the one hand, it seems difficult to describe the plurality’s
conclusion in PICS as emerging from binary analysis, insofar as diversity
in the closely related context of higher education is not only legitimate,
but qualifies as a “compelling governmental interest.” It would be odd if
a relatively subtle contextual shift—from university to high school—
transformed a compelling governmental interest into a flatly illegitimate
one. It is more plausible that the contextual shift altered the valence of
each permissible commitment, thereby altering the normativelyappropriate reconciliation. Consider as well Citizen United’s conclusion
that preserving the legitimacy of the electoral system does not satisfy
heightened scrutiny’s “ends” requirement.33 It is difficult to claim that
the goal of preserving the legitimacy of our electoral system constitutes
an illegitimate governmental purpose. It is more natural to say that
Citizens United’s majority did not think any goal, apart from preventing
quid pro quo corruption,34 was sufficiently important to justify a
restriction on political speech. These characterizations of PICS and
Citizens United fit the paradigm of trading-off’s qualitative analysis, not
smoke-out’s binary approach.
On the other hand, perhaps binary smoke-out really does describe the
reasoning process of the PICS plurality. On this view, these Justices
believed that affirmative action indeed is per se illegitimate—end of
story.35 The PICS plurality treated diversity in higher education as a

31. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools (“PICS”) v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 722
(2007) (plurality opinion).
32. See id. at 747.
33. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010).
34. See id. (noting that campaign contribution limits, unlike limits on independent expenditures,
are an accepted means to prevent quid pro quo corruption) (referencing and overruling McConnell
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 136–38, 138 n.40).
35. See PICS, 551 U.S. at 765 (plurality opinion).
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compelling governmental interest only because of stare decisis—that is,
only because an earlier Supreme Court decision had so held.36 On this
view, the PICS plurality deployed a binary smoke-out methodology to
narrow the scope of precedent it was unable—or unwilling—to fully
overturn.
But while binary smoke-out may describe the thought process of some
of the Justices comprising the PICS plurality, smoke-out does not seem
to generalize to all, or even most, applications of heightened scrutiny. For
example, did the Citizens United majority really think that campaign
finance regulations to prevent quid pro quo corruption also should be
unconstitutional? And even if some or all did,37 do these Justices really
think all speech restrictions are unconstitutional? If the answer to either
of these questions is “no”—as seems likely—then even the Justices
constituting the PICS plurality find some government policies are
sufficiently important to allow right-restrictions. And this would mean
that binary smoke-out is not generalizable even for the Justices who
joined the PICS plurality.38 Rather, something like Casey’s non-binary
trading-off paradigm describes some sub-domain of heightened
scrutiny’s “ends"-prong analysis. And though I will not be able to prove
it here, trading-off likely is a substantial, if not the dominant, sub-domain.
Finally, it is worth noting that the trade-off paradigm sheds critical
light on an aspect of Professor Schauer’s framework. Though Professor
Schauer’s two-step approach is analytically correct,39 the locution
degree-of-protection might be misleading in two related respects. First,
36. That earlier decision was Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). See PICS, 551 U.S. at
722 (noting this).
37. Smoke-out might accurately describe the late Justice Scalia’s approach to racial
classifications, and perhaps Justice Thomas’s as well. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 524 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In my view there is only one circumstance in
which the States may act by race to ‘undo the effects of past discrimination’: where that is necessary
to eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial classification.”).
38. It might be objected that the individual Justice’s intent does not matter. After all, following
Citizens United, one governmental end is sufficient to allow campaign finance restrictions,
regardless of whether one or several Justices might think it should be otherwise. This objection is
illuminating, though ultimately it does not fully deliver as an objection. It is illuminating insofar
as it makes clear that there are two possible ways we might try to make sense of answers to the
Sufficiency Question. This Essay’s approach is to seek an explanation of how a decision maker
goes about answering it. The objection makes clear that we also might seek to provide a rational
reconstruction of the answers that constitute the case law’s black letter law—that is to say, the most
plausible rationalization of the pattern that emerges from the case law, which is not tethered to the
subjective intent of those who provided the answers. While that is true—and is why the objection
is illuminating—the objection ultimately fails because there is no reason to believe that rational
reconstruction is the only useful inquiry. Rather, explanation and rational reconstruction are
different inquiries, and explanation is both interesting and important.
39. That is, Professor Schauer’s two-step approach is correct, at least as a descriptive matter. It
is an interesting question as to whether there should be a first-step coverage determination.
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it seems to mischaracterize the decision-making process. Electing to
allow some trade-offs between a constitutional commitment and other
societal commitments is not so much a determination of what degree-ofprotection to give the right, as much as a decision as to how multiple
societal commitments are to be reconciled when they come into conflict.
Second, the locution degree-of-protection might frame the process of
answering the Sufficiency Question in a manner that gives excessive
consideration to the constitutional commitment. When asked how much
protection is to be given to a single good, one might be inclined to assume
more is always better. The trade-off paradigm, by contrast, more readily
retains awareness that multiple commitments must be accommodated. In
law, as in life, seldom is there a free lunch. More of one commitment
frequently comes at the expense of others.
III. OUR (SLIGHTLY) REFORMULATED AND (SUBSTANTIALLY)
REINVIGORATED QUERY
So let us return to a more-refined formulation of the question with
which this Essay began: How do judges determine what qualifies as a
sufficiently important governmental interest such that a trade-off can be
made with a constitutionally protected interest? Or, in this Essay’s shorthand, how do judges answer the Sufficiency Question?
Beyond what has already been canvassed here regarding Croson and
Casey, the Supreme Court has not provided sustained attention to the
methodological question of how judges answer the Sufficiency Question.
Nor have scholars yet jumped in to fill the explanatory void. 40 Though
not all explanatory voids are troublesome, this one is. Three
considerations make it important to have an answer as to how courts
answer the Sufficiency Question. The first is the Sufficiency Question’s
ubiquity under contemporary doctrine by virtue of the fact that, as
discussed in relation to Roe and Casey, the countervailing commitment
that is sufficiently important to permit trading-off a commitment of
constitutional dimension need not itself rise to the level of a constitutional
interest.41 If it were otherwise—if a constitutional interest only could be
traded-off against a competing constitutional interest with which it came
into conflict—then the Sufficiency Question would arise far less
frequently. Second, there are compelling normative reasons for
contemporary doctrine’s allowance of trade-offs of constitutional
40. An intervention by me a few years ago is all there is. See Rosen, supra note 11, at 1596–
1603.
41. See supra Part II (noting the Court’s sparse guidance as regards answering the Sufficiency
Question).
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interests for sub-constitutional ends. Our normative sensibilities are too
complex to be adequately captured by a simple rule that would authorize
constitutional rights to categorically trump all competing subconstitutional.42 Third, our normative sensibilities also are too complex
to be adequately captured by a simple rule that would give trumping
authority to one constitutional right as against all other competing
constitutional interests.43
In short, the Sufficiency Question not only is, but should be,
ubiquitous. It therefore is advisable to develop an account of how the
Sufficiency Question is properly answered.
IV. DEFERENCE AND GO-IT-ALONE
Though the Court has not provided a sustained explanation of how it
goes about answering the Sufficiency Question, two distinct approaches
can be discerned in the case law. The first, exemplified by the majority
in Grutter v. Bollinger, is for judges to substantially defer to the
judgments of non-judicial institutions.44 The Grutter Court deferred
heavily to the non-judicial institution—a public law school45—that had
acted so as to restrict the constitutional right, and to the non-governmental
entities—including retired officers and civilian leaders of the military and
“major American businesses” like General Motors and 3M—that had
submitted amici briefs testifying to the importance of diversity.46 The
second approach, found in the Citizens United majority opinion, might be
dubbed as “go-it-alone” because the Court paid no heed to the views of
other institutions. The fact that multiple Congresses spanning more than
a century thought that protecting the democratic process was important
enough to require campaign finance regulation did not figure at all when
42. See Rosen, supra note 11, at 1554–60 (providing extensive explanation of this point).
43. Id. at 1555–60. For an extensive argument that constitutional rights can come into conflict,
see Mark D. Rosen, Two Ways of Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Equality and Religious
Freedom, 4 J.L., RELIGION & ST. 117 (2016).
44. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (holding that the University of
Michigan’s law school admission program did not violate Equal Protection).
45. See id. (“The Law School’s educational judgment that . . . diversity is essential to its
education mission is one to which we defer” in deciding that “in the context of higher education,
[there is] a compelling state interest in student body diversity.”); see also PICS v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 845 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“If we are to insist upon unanimity in the
social science literature before finding a compelling interest, we might never find one. I believe
only that the Constitution allows democratically elected school boards to make up their own minds
as how best to include people of all races in one America.”).
46. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330–31 (citing to 3M’s and General Motor Corp.’s briefs as amici
curiae, which both took the stance that skills necessary in the current worldwide marketplace can
only be developed through exposure to diverse cultures, people, and ideas).
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the majority went about answering the Sufficiency Question.47
At first glance, the first approach’s deference to other institutions
might seem surprising, and wrong. After all, if rights are judicially
enforced restrictions on democratic majorities to protect minorities, why
should the Court take account of the majority’s views, as expressed in
non-judicial institutions, as to what satisfies the Sufficiency Question?
But this objection to the first approach rests on an incomplete
appreciation of how rights operate. Disregarding the views of nonjudicial institutions would be sensible if rights operated solely as checks
on majoritarianism. But rights play other roles. For instance, they also
serve as signifiers of particularly important societal commitments that
guide the manner in which those commitments (viz. rights) are to be
reconciled with competing societal commitments. This second role
played by rights is well-captured in Casey’s trade-off paradigm. Because
rights also operate in this second capacity, the majoritarian-check
narrative is incomplete.
Insofar as rights operate consistently with the trade-off paradigm, four
interlocking reasons give rise to the conclusion that judges should
presumptively take account of other societal institutions’ views as to what
satisfies the Sufficiency Question. First, generating the non-binary,
qualitative answers to the Sufficiency Question does not call upon the
special professional competencies that belong to judges and lawyers.
Second, and conversely, non-judicial institutions may have superior
access to, or the ability to appreciate, information and considerations that
bear on answering the Sufficiency Question.48 Third, because the
Sufficiency Question serves as a situs for fleshing out how society
reconciles its multiple competing commitments, answering the
Sufficiency Question is a deeply subjective process that simultaneously
reflects and constructs the country’s political identity. Fourth, and
finally, insofar as answering the Sufficiency Question is both identityreflecting and identity-constructing, the principle of democratic selfgovernance demands the participation of institutions beyond the
judiciary. These four considerations explain why Grutter’s attentiveness
to non-judicial institutions’ views concerning diversity’s significance

47. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 357–62 (2010); see also Rosen,
supra note 11, at 1605–11 (critiquing the Citizens United majority opinion on this ground).
48. For example, as regards campaign finance, “members of the elected branches are better
situated than courts to understand the dynamics, and pathologies, of money in politics.” Rosen,
supra note 11, at 1609; see generally David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine:
The President’s Non-Enforcement Power, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2000) (considering
respects in which the President may have superior access to information that is important to
rendering certain constitutional decisions).
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was not misplaced.
V. IMPORTANT REMAINING QUESTIONS
But how much deference do judges owe other institutions’ views as to
what does and does not satisfy the Sufficiency Question? Though I
cannot fully answer this important and difficult question here, several
preliminary observations are possible. Judges should (1) presumptively
(2) take account of other societal institutions’ views. The presumption
might be rebutted if there is reason to suspect the institution’s decision
making. Take account of is deliberately open-ended insofar as it does not
specify the degree of deference. And there is no reason to think courts
should defer equally to all institutions. To the contrary, institutional
differentiation seems sensible: a large public university’s input could
conceivably be treated differently than that of a school board. Likewise,
non-governmental organizations’ input might merit different deference
than that of governmental institutions.
The above comments raise many important issues that I have not
answered here. Determining if an institution’s decision-making is
suspect requires a baseline for measuring trustworthiness.49 Are there
methodologies and considerations that appropriately inform how nonjudicial institutions should go about answering the Sufficiency Question?
Does the answer vary across institutions? Finally, insofar as deference
does not mean blind obedience, what remains of the judicial role in
answering the Sufficiency Question?
These are all important questions. But their elucidation must await
another day.

49. Relatedly, deciding how much deference is owed may require a measure of deferenceworthiness.

